AUKUS Defense Pact: ITAR Exemptions and the Road to Success
The AUKUS defence pact among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States seeks to bolster their collective defence capabilities. However, the pact is currently stuck in legislative limbo due to constraints imposed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which governs the export of sensitive U.S. defence technologies.
The ITAR Factor
The ITAR serves a crucial function by preventing "malign actors" from obtaining sensitive technology, as noted by a State Department fact sheet. Yet, officials from AUKUS countries insist that for the pact to move forward, a blanket ITAR exemption must be granted to the U.K. and Australia. This request has merit but comes with risks; after all, the policy already offers over 50 exemptions to close allies.
In a recent discussion, Michael Biercuk, CEO of Q-CTRL, shed light on the regulatory limitations imposed by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on the AUKUS alliance and U.S. defence sector.
The remarks follow the July announcement by the Australian Defence Department about their collaborative venture with Q-CTRL, a leading tech startup specialising in quantum technology. With operations in the U.S., Australia, and the UK, the company is actively working on developing an alternative navigation system for military platforms, including nuclear submarines, as a replacement for GPS systems.
“The United States will not be able to partner with Australia and the U.K. in this,” Biercuk said.
If we really want cross-border participation among these very friendly nations in this area of critical technology, we just have to remove this one roadblock. Everybody wants to avoid engaging with the United States because ITAR is very difficult to comply with.” - Head of Q-CTRL, Michael Biercuk
Biercuk emphasised that without a comprehensive reform of the existing ITAR framework, the technological advancement and information sharing critical to the U.S. defence industries and the AUKUS initiative are at risk of being stifled. He articulated the urgency of revising regulatory policies to better accommodate the collaborative nature of modern defence partnerships.
For example, he noted that ITAR hinders employees at Q-CTRL’s Los Angeles, California, office from collaborating on the technology it’s pioneering in Australia.
This concern is legitimate. Legislators should consider crafting nuanced ITAR exemptions specifically for AUKUS, but with safeguards that ensure technology doesn't fall into the wrong hands. Such a move would display adaptability in U.S. policy while respecting the pact's strategic significance.
Defense Industry Symbiosis
U.S. defence companies are eager to engage with Australia, signifying a potential symbiotic relationship beneficial to both nations.
"When you can find ways to collaborate with your closest allies, you’re going to incentivize a whole bunch of interesting things,” said Mara Karlin, U.S. assistant secretary of defence for strategies, plans and capabilities.
Given the stakes, Congress must act swiftly to allow these countries to be eligible for U.S. federal grants under the Defense Production Act, which could further facilitate advancements in defence technologies and supply chains.
Legislative Quagmire
Despite bipartisan support for AUKUS, the legislation faces hurdles from those concerned about the U.S.'s industrial base to fulfil its commitments under the pact.
"This plan, if implemented without change, would unacceptably weaken the U.S. fleet," warned Senate Republicans in a letter to President Biden.
The objection raises a valid point: any decrease in U.S. capabilities would be counterproductive to the pact’s original goal to counter China's military buildup. However, not proceeding with AUKUS threatens to weaken the geopolitical position of all three member countries. A balanced approach is required, perhaps by supplementing domestic defence budgeting alongside the AUKUS commitments.
Extending the Partnership
The pact offers the potential to include other countries, notably other Five Eyes nations and even non-AUKUS countries for niche technological contributions. This offers an avenue to further dilute China’s increasing geopolitical influence by creating a multi-nation coalition of technologically advanced allies.
Australia is waiting on Congress to pass authorizations for the nuclear submarine transfer before work begins on the infrastructure necessary to sustain the vessels.
But those efforts have stalled while Senate Republicans push for additional funding for the submarine-industrial base beyond the $647 million the Biden administration requested for fiscal 2024.
“You cannot have an effective transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia without systemic change to U.S. export control, tech transfer and information sharing processes as they apply to Australia,” said Ashley Townshend, a senior fellow for Indo-Pacific security at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank.
“This is already a hugely ambitious undertaking for both countries, and for Australia it will require us to move at an extremely fast pace toward building out the domestic nuclear stewardship, infrastructure, submarine production facilities and so forth,” Townshend said.
Republicans and Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee rallied together in July to unanimously advance an authorization to transfer up to two Virginia-class submarines to Australia.
“The transfer language really shows a real commitment by Congress,” Rep. Joe Courtney of Connecticut, the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee’s sea power panel, told Defense News. “Australia is prepared to make investments we want to make in terms of building up Virginia production tied to this AUKUS goal post.”
AUKUS Ambitions and Realities: Experts Weigh in on Strategic Cooperation and Challenges Ahead
The AUKUS agreement represents an ambitious endeavour, aimed at ushering Australia into the nuclear submarine club while deepening technological partnerships among the U.S., UK, and Australia. However, experts caution that delays and complications may pose serious risks.
Lauren Kahn, a Senior Research Analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology, extolled the AUKUS strategy for its forward-thinking approach, specifically its focus on immediate steps such as workforce enhancement, infrastructure upgrades, and specialised training for nuclear-qualified sailors. She did, however, flag the bureaucratic roadblocks that may hamper progress. Kahn argued that timely amendments in ITAR and the Defense Production Act are vital for enabling seamless information sharing and technology collaboration among the allies.
Contrastingly, the UK's capability to deliver on its AUKUS commitments comes under scrutiny. Critics like Mark Francois MP have pointed out the existing challenges at Barrow-in-Furness shipyard with the Astute class of nuclear submarines, calling the program a "disaster." Delays also plague the new Dreadnought class of ballistic missile submarines, raising questions about BAE Systems' ability to deliver on time for both UK and AUKUS projects.
Rear Admiral Philip Mathias, a former British chief of nuclear vessels, recently expressed his reservations about the UK's role in AUKUS. He highlighted the "abysmal" performance of the submarine delivery agency and condemned the UK's historical delays and inefficiencies in submarine programs. In his view, these factors increase "the substantial risk of delivery given the UK's woeful performance and Australia's lack of nuclear submarine expertise."
“the substantial risk of delivery given the UK’s woeful performance and Australia’s lack of nuclear submarine expertise.” Rear Admiral Philip Mathias
Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute's international security program, offers another perspective, warning of the geopolitical implications for Australia. He suggests that AUKUS could potentially turn Australia into a U.S. military stronghold, thereby increasing the nation's vulnerability in a conflict scenario involving China. Roggeveen asserts that this strategy may not align with Australia's core security interests and could even risk plunging the nation into a nuclear conflict.
“We have also chosen to build military capabilities of our own that are designed expressly to contribute to American operations to defeat China. These fateful decisions threaten to draw Australia into a war that is not central to our security interests, and which could end in nuclear catastrophe.” - Sam Roggeveen director of the Lowy Institute
The mixed opinions among experts underscore the complex landscape AUKUS must navigate. The initiative carries the weight of geopolitical ramifications, technological challenges, and the urgent need for bureaucratic reform. Its success will hinge on the ability of all three nations to resolve these issues promptly and efficiently.
The evidence that the AUKUS pact represents is an important “game changer", towards the rhythm of geopolitics in the region and a strategic move to counterbalance China's growing military might. The U.S. Congress faces a delicate balancing act: honouring ITAR's national security goals while accommodating AUKUS's strategic imperatives. With a well-calibrated approach, both can be achieved, but the clock is ticking.
